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This volume will be a most welcome addition to the personal library of anyone interested in 
contemporary epistemology: the papers here collected provide a very comprehensive and clear defence 
of one of the most radical and widely discussed research programs, as offered by one of its fiercest and 
lucid advocates. Kornblith’s naturalistic epistemology is discussed from a number of perspectives 
touching on an extensive range of topics, including what epistemology is about, the importance of its 
social dimension, the link between epistemology and metaphysics, epistemic normativity, the critique 
of internalism, the extent to which externalist theories offer satisfactory explanations, the relation 
between human knowledge and animal knowledge, the reliance on intuitions in philosophical 
methodology, and the broad theory of rationality. There is no doubt that the hope that ‘collecting [the 
papers] in one place will serve to illuminate their interconnections and highlight the integrity of the 
vision that informs them’ (1) has been fulfilled. 
One way to describe Kornblith’s naturalism is by contrasting it with rival approaches to 
epistemology. According to a popular reconstruction (Goldman and Pust 1998), epistemology engages 
in at least two substantial tasks: the descriptive one of identifying the properties that make a belief a 
case of knowledge, and the normative one of formulating norms to guide agents’ epistemic activity so 
that they can acquire knowledge. For traditional analytic epistemology, both tasks can be achieved 
through the armchair method of advancing conceptual analyses and principles, and revising them in the 
light of counterexamples—all in splendid ignorance of the results of empirical research, as the saying 
goes. On the other hand, a brand of naturalism that we might dub moderate agrees with the traditional 
view that the descriptive task can be achieved from the armchair, but it insists that the normative part 
requires the identification of methods of belief-formation that are actually reliable, and thus it needs the 
contribution of empirical investigations: whether a method is reliable or not is an empirical question. 
By contrast, according to the kind of naturalism defended by Kornblith, which we may call 
uncompromising, traditional philosophical methods should play no role in epistemology: rather, we 
should appeal to the results of empirical investigation from the initial task of figuring out what 
knowledge is. 
Kornblith argues that it is a mistake to try to analyse the concept of knowledge at all: what we 
really care about is what the category—knowledge itself—is (see especially chapters 10 and 12). While 
chapter 10 lists several pressing issues for the advocates of conceptual analysis, the argumentative 
weight in Kornblith’s reasoning appears to be carried by the following claim: ‘since our ultimate target 
is the extra-mental phenomenon [knowledge itself], we would do better to study those extra-mental 
phenomena directly rather than to study our own…concepts’ (166-7). Kornblith further contends that 
in order to find out what knowledge itself is, we need to see how knowledge gets its purchase in science 
(e.g. 110, 120), and that once we do so, we see that knowledge is a natural kind. There would be a lot 
to say about the thesis that knowledge is a natural kind—and I take the chance to note that at p. 192 we 
find a helpful clarification of the often contested (e.g.  Feldman 1999:179, Goldman 2005: 404) analogy 
between knowledge and water or aluminium—but in this short review I prefer to focus on the 
methodological proposal advanced by Kornblith. 
One may agree that the target of epistemological investigation is knowledge itself rather than 
anyone’s concept of it, and even agree that the advocates of conceptual analysis need to clarify what 
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exactly they are doing—for example, whether they wish to analyse the concept of the folk or the concept 
of the experts, or why psychological evidence suggesting that the contours of human concepts are not 
represented by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions does not diminish the importance of engaging 
in traditional conceptual analysis (see ch.10). Yet, one would be under no obvious pressure to conclude 
that conceptual analysis in epistemology should be altogether abandoned, as opposed to, say, being 
adequately reformed. 
A rather naïve thought in defence of the importance of conceptual analysis in epistemology 
could go along lines similar to the following. If believing P is necessary for knowing P, and having the 
conceptual repertoire needed to grasp the content of P is necessary for believing P, then possession of 
the relevant concepts is necessary for knowing P. If so, possession of some concepts is necessary for 
knowledge—knowledge itself, that is. Then, one may think that the category of knowledge is, in part, 
a conceptual category. But if the category in question is at least in part a conceptual category, then it is 
not at all outlandish to suppose that an investigation into the concept of knowledge could help in 
understanding some features of the category itself.  
Of course, the foregoing is rather generic, and it serves only to express some initial concern 
about the facility with which Kornblith seems to move from the claim “what we care about is the 
category of knowledge” to “conceptual analysis is of no real use in epistemology”. Indeed, it does not 
take into account something important about uncompromising naturalism. Kornblith maintains that 
animals have knowledge too, and he further contends that the knowledge of animals and the knowledge 
of humans are the same phenomenon and can be explained in a unified way. Indeed, Kornblith takes 
such characterization of knowledge to be the target of epistemological investigations (chapter 8).  
Now it’s worth recalling that it is not clear whether animals have concepts at all, and that even 
if they do, their concepts are likely to be very different from ours (see, for example, Peacocke 2001). 
But if the notion of knowledge that we want to account for is one that concerns both animals and 
humans, it seems wrong to say that the possession of some concepts is necessary for it. If so, the sort of 
knowledge that is under investigation is not a conceptual category. Shall we then accept Kornblith’s 
claim that in order to find out about the category of knowledge we should drop conceptual analysis and 
see how knowledge enters the scientific theoretical picture? 
By way of a reply, I’d like to offer two general considerations. First, when Kornblith claims 
that we should see how the notion of knowledge matters in science, he is thinking of the natural 
sciences—as opposed to human sciences. One may wonder why. If we think that to find out what the 
category of X is we need to find out how X gets in purchase in the sciences tout court, it does seem odd 
to set aside human sciences when the topic of investigation is knowledge. Arguably, human sciences 
have given way more attention to knowledge than natural sciences. One could suspect that Kornblith’s 
view is, at some level, motivated by a bias against human sciences.  
Secondly, the importance that Kornblith gives to the knowledge of animals, and his de facto 
taking this as the paradigmatic case of knowledge for the purposes of epistemological investigations, 
brings us close to a sometimes heard objection against uncompromising naturalism. Namely, that it 
changes the subject by targeting something rather different than the notion of knowledge that 
philosophers have traditionally tried to explain. One way of formulating the complaint may be the 
following: Kornblith’s version of naturalism gives up on accounting for the kind of knowledge that is 
specifically human.  
To conclude, one is left with the impression that if the naturalism defended by Kornblith is to 
meet all the explanatory demands that would seem to bear on an epistemology with wide ambitions, it 
has yet to meet this challenge: to provide an account of a (minimal) notion of knowledge that humans 
and animals alike can obtain, and show how that is linked with what is distinctive of human 
knowledge—which, for example, requires one to possess some concepts, and can be reinforced, or 
called into question, by examining one’s grounds, or through higher-order reasoning more generally. 
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To be fair, this is a challenge for any epistemology with wide ambitions, and it is a challenge that has 
entered the epistemological agenda largely thanks to Kornblith’s work. 
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